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• U.S. Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS, launched in 2011, supported Ugandan 
efforts against the LRA that began in 1986. The combined effort has been widely 
lauded for its humanitarian approach to a rebel force largely composed of  
abducted child soldiers. The Ugandans isolated the LRA from popular support and 
forced them to flee to neighboring states in 2008. Due to the effectiveness of this 
approach and the recent withdrawal of U.S. and Ugandan forces, the authors 
developed a case study of the conflict to identify lessons learned before the 
opportunity was lost.
• How did the Uganda People’s Defense Force, with assistance from the 
United States and other partners, conduct its campaign against the 
Lord’s Resistance Army?
• Our argument is that the implementation of a carefully-designed amnesty policy 
and isolation of popular support (all based on a thorough understanding of the 
enemy) enabled Uganda to defeat the LRA as an insurgency and strengthen 
Uganda’s legitimacy in the north (the LRA’s home territory).
Route traveled by the student researchers while conducting interviews with 
veterans of the Northern Uganda War from both sides (approx. 700 miles).
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Results
• Understanding of the cultures of northern Uganda 
enabled the development of an effective campaign.
• The Ugandan amnesty policy was the driving force in 
LRA defections and contributed to the surrender of 
two previous rebel groups in the 1980s (DDR).
• COIN campaign had three lines of effort: military 
force, civil development, and amnesty (PSYOP).
• The U.S. used the same types of appeals that had 
been effective for the Ugandans, but amplified them. 
The “So What” Next Steps
• What aspects of this campaign are transferrable?
• Are there other conflicts where a similar amnesty policy 
can dissolve insurgents’ will to fight, such as Somalia?
• Is COIN more effective in a state’s own “backyard”?
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Graph of monthly LRA combatant defections. For the thesis, the definition  of ‘defector’ 
is limited to males of at least 18 years of age and at least six months with the LRA.
Research design
• Main hypothesis: the campaign against the LRA was 
deliberately planned and carefully synchronized.
• Approach: historical and statistical analysis from 
interviews with Ugandan and U.S. military participants, 
former LRA, NGOs, and local government officials.
• Data sources: professional experience, interviews, 
official records, academic journals, NGO and news 
media reports, and scholarly books.
A sample U.S. leaflet disseminated during OOC to promote defections. The leaflet 
features multiple former LRA fighters together as proof of life. The reverse side of 
the leaflet featured a map of locations where fighters could safely defect.
• Amnesty for insurgents is an effective “third option”.
• Understanding the target audience is the critical 
prerequisite in the success of PSYOP.




























































































































































LRA Adult Male Combatant Defections (2011-2017)
Defectors Linear  (Defectors)
